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I. Introduction 
After a 1,900-mile journey from Venezuela to 
Paulsboro, New Jersey, the M/T Athos I, a single-hulled 
oil tanker, had come within 900 feet of its intended berth 
when it struck an abandoned anchor on the bottom of the 
Delaware River. The anchor pierced the Athos I’s hull, 
causing approximately 264,000 gallons of crude oil to spill 
into the river. 
The cost of cleaning up the spill was $143 million. 
We are presented with the question of how to apportion 
responsibility for that cost between three parties. The first 
party comprises not only the shipowner, Frescati Shipping 
Company, Ltd., but also the ship’s manager, Tsakos 
Shipping & Trading, S.A. (collectively, “Frescati”). 
Frescati, through an intermediary, contracted to deliver 
crude oil to the second party, which is made up of several 
affiliated companies—CITGO Asphalt Refining 
Company, CITGO Petroleum Corporation, and CITGO 
East Coast Oil Corporation (collectively, “CARCO”). The 
oil shipment was to be delivered to CARCO at its marine 
terminal in Paulsboro. After the oil spill, Frescati paid for 
the cleanup effort, and was eventually reimbursed $88 
million by the third party to this litigation, the United 
States, pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990, 
33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. Frescati and the United States 
now seek to recover their cleanup costs from CARCO. 
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II. Background 
a. Facts1 
The M/T Athos I was a single-hulled tanker ship, 
measuring approximately 748 feet long and 105 feet 
wide.2 As owner of the ship, Frescati chartered it to an 
intermediary which assigned it to a tanker pool. CARCO 
sub-chartered the Athos I from the tanker pool to deliver a 
shipment of crude oil from Puerto Miranda, Venezuela, to 
CARCO’s berth in Paulsboro, New Jersey. CARCO was 
the shipping customer as well as the wharfinger who 
operated the berth. 
 The Athos I, carrying CARCO’s shipment, left 
Venezuela in mid-November 2004 under the command of 
the ship’s master, Captain Iosif Markoutsis. CARCO had 
                                              
1 The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 
2 Single-hulled tanker ships drew the attention of 
regulators and the public in the wake of the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez oil spill off the Alaskan coast; the Exxon Valdez, 
like the Athos I, was a single-hulled tanker. Single-hulled 
ships were initially subjected to extra regulation, see, e.g., 
33 C.F.R. § 157.455, but have since been phased out of 
operation in the United States in favor of double-hulled 
ships. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703a. 
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instructed the Athos I to load to a draft3 of 37 feet or less 
in Venezuela, and provided a warranty that the ship would 
be able to safely reach the berth in Paulsboro as long as it 
arrived with a draft of 37 feet or less. When the Athos I left 
Venezuela, it had a draft of 36′ 6″. Over the course of the 
Athos I’s journey, the ship burned fuel and the crew 
consumed fresh water. As the ship grew lighter, it rode 
higher on the water. By the time it reached the entrance to 
the Delaware Bay, the Athos I was drawing 36′ 4″. 
Because the fuel and fresh water were consumed from 
tanks located in the stern, or rear, of the ship, the Athos I 
was no longer sailing at an even keel; it was “trimmed by 
the bow,” meaning that the bow, or front of the ship, was 
deeper in the water than the ship’s stern. To return the ship 
to an even keel, the Athos I took on approximately 510 
metric tons of ballast to tanks in the rear of the ship. 
Although the parties dispute how much the Athos I was 
drawing as it approached CARCO’s berth, the District 
Court found that the added ballast brought the ship’s draft 
to 36′ 7″. 
The Athos I reached the entrance to the Delaware 
Bay without incident on November 26th. All vessels 
                                              
3 A ship’s draft is the measurement from the water line to 
the bottom of the ship’s hull, known as the keel. As a ship 
loads cargo, it becomes heavier and sits lower in the water. 
Its draft thereby increases. 
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traveling north from the Delaware Bay to the Delaware 
River are required to use a Delaware River Pilot to 
navigate the waters. At the appropriate time, a local river 
pilot, Captain Howard Teal, Jr. boarded the ship and 
guided it up the Delaware River until it reached a section 
of the river near CARCO’s berth. At that point, a local 
docking pilot, Captain Joseph Bethel, replaced Captain 
Teal and began to navigate the ship to its berth at 
Paulsboro. Captains Teal and Bethel both engaged Captain 
Markoutsis in conversations about the Athos I, its passage 
from the Delaware Bay to the Paulsboro berth, water 
depth, underkeel clearance, and other local conditions. 
The substance and sufficiency of those conversations are 
disputed by the parties. 
CARCO’s berth is on the New Jersey side of the 
Delaware River, directly across from Philadelphia 
International Airport. To reach the berth from the main 
river channel, ships must pass through an anchorage 
immediately adjacent to the berth. The anchorage, known 
as Federal Anchorage Number 9 or the Mantua Creek 
Anchorage, is a federally-designated section of the river in 
which ships may anchor; it is periodically surveyed for 
depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, as 
Corps resources allow. No government agency is 
responsible for preemptively searching for unknown 
obstructions to navigation in the anchorage, although the 
Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
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Administration (NOAA), and the Corps of Engineers work 
together to remove or mark obstructions when they are 
discovered. Anyone who wishes to search for obstructions 
in the anchorage may do so, but anyone wishing to dredge 
in the anchorage requires a permit from the Corps of 
Engineers. 
It was in this anchorage on November 26, 2004, at 
9:02 p.m., that the allision occurred.4 The Athos I was only 
900 feet—not much more than the ship’s length—from 
CARCO’s berth. The ship was “just about dead in the 
water” as Captain Bethel slowly positioned it to dock. 
Suddenly, the ship began to list and oil appeared in the 
river. At the time of the allision, the ship was in the middle 
of a 180° rotation, guided by tugboats, and moving astern 
and to port (backwards and to the ship’s left). The path 
taken by the Athos I through the anchorage passed, at its 
shallowest point, over a 38-foot shoal. Most of the 
anchorage was deeper, and the depth of the river at the site 
of the allision was at least 41.65 feet at the time. 
Captain Bethel immediately called the Coast Guard 
to alert them to the spill, while Captain Markoutsis rushed 
to the engine room and transferred oil from the breached 
                                              
4 An allision is “[t]he contact of a vessel with a stationary 
object such as an anchored vessel or a pier.” Allision, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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cargo tank into another tank. The crew of the Athos I was 
eventually able to stop the leak, but not before 264,321 
gallons of crude oil had spilled into the Delaware River. 
The cleanup effort began almost immediately. 
Although it was ultimately successful, it took months to 
complete and the efforts of thousands of workers at a cost 
of $143 million. The cause of the allision was not 
discovered until more than a month later, when an 
abandoned anchor was discovered on the riverbed. The 
search for the obstruction that caused the allision proved 
difficult. An experienced sonar operator using side-scan 
sonar conducted the first search shortly after the allision, 
but did not recognize the anchor.5 A second search by the 
                                              
5 Side-scan sonar is used to locate objects on the sea floor 
and works like a camera, but using sound instead of light 
to form an image. Single-beam sonar, by contrast, uses 
sound to measure the depth along a single line traced by a 
sounding mechanism known as a towpath. If an 
obstruction is not located along the towpath, it would not 
be detected, and even if the towpath crossed an 
obstruction, the data would simply show a depth change 
rather than the obstruction itself. Before the allision, 
CARCO used single-beam sonar to survey its berthing 
area and a small portion of the anchorage. The government 
typically used single-beam sonar when it surveyed the 
anchorage for depth and dredging purposes. 
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same operator, conducted several weeks later, eventually 
discovered the anchor with the use of side-scan sonar in 
combination with divers and magnetometers. The anchor 
weighed approximately nine tons and was 6′ 8″ long, 7′ 3″ 
wide, and 4′ 6″ high. It has since been removed from the 
river. 
The parties dispute the positioning of the anchor at 
the time of the allision. An anchor like the one that 
punctured the Athos I has two stable positions. It can sit at 
rest in the “flukes-up” or “flukes-down” position. A 
flukes-up anchor stands almost upright on its crown, with 
the flukes pointed upward at a 65° angle, while a flukes-
down anchor has essentially tipped over, with both the 
crown and flukes of the anchor lying horizontally on the 
riverbed. In the flukes-up position, the anchor sticks up 
approximately seven feet above the riverbed, but in the 
flukes-down position, it rises only about 3′ 5″ above the 
riverbed. The District Court found that the anchor was 
flukes-up at the time of the allision, but CARCO asserts 
that the anchor was flukes-down, pointing to side-scan 
sonar data gathered as part of a geophysical study of the 
Delaware River that showed the anchor was flukes-down 
in 2001, three years before the allision.6 The anchor was 
                                              
6 The anchor was identified in the geophysical study data 
only after the allision occurred. The parties agree that in 
2001, the anchor was flukes-down, and that no one was 
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also flukes-down when it was discovered after the allision. 
Between 2001 and the allision in 2004, 241 vessels went 
to CARCO’s Paulsboro berth, and many others have 
anchored in the anchorage over the years. The District 
Court theorized that one of those anchored ships could 
have dragged its own anchor chain along the riverbed, 
catching on the abandoned anchor and shifting its position. 
The court ultimately concluded that although the actual 
cause of the anchor’s movement would never be known, 
at some point between the geophysical study in 2001 and 
the allision in 2004, the anchor shifted from flukes-down 
to flukes-up. A flukes-down anchor would not have allided 
with the Athos I if the Athos I’s draft was less than 37 feet; 
a flukes-up anchor would have. 
 Now, more than thirteen years after the allision, the 
Athos I has been scrapped, the anchor removed from the 
river, and the oil spill cleaned up. What remains is this case 
for apportionment of cleanup costs. 
b. Procedural History 
This case, like the Athos I, has been on a long 
journey. Over the past thirteen years, the matter has been 
to trial before two different judges and heard on appeal 
                                              
aware of the anchor’s existence before the allision—
except, perhaps, the still-unidentified owner who 
abandoned it. 
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before two separate panels of this Court. We briefly 
summarize that history. 
Litigation began shortly after the allision in January, 
2005, when Frescati filed a “Petition for Exoneration from 
or Limitation of Liability.” CARCO and others filed 
claims for damages associated with the spill. Frescati then 
filed a counterclaim against CARCO for its damages. The 
United States eventually reimbursed Frescati for some of 
its cleanup expenses pursuant to the OPA, and filed suit 
against CARCO as a partial subrogee to some of Frescati’s 
claims. The claims of Frescati and the United States 
against CARCO were consolidated with CARCO’s 
counterclaims and defenses, forming the litigation as it 
exists today. 
The case was first tried in a forty-one-day bench 
trial before the Honorable John P. Fullam. Judge Fullam 
found that CARCO was not liable for the casualty in 
contract, tort, or otherwise; Frescati and the United States 
appealed. On appeal, we affirmed in part, vacated in part, 
and remanded the case because the District Court had 
failed to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). In re 
Frescati, 718 F.3d 184, 189, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2013). 
We determined, among other things, that Frescati 
was a third-party beneficiary of CARCO’s safe berth 
warranty, and that the allision occurred in the approach to 
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CARCO’s terminal, meaning that CARCO had an 
unspecified duty of care to Frescati in tort. We remanded 
for the District Court to determine whether Frescati met 
the conditions for the safe berth warranty to apply. We also 
asked the District Court, if necessary, to determine the 
appropriate duty of care CARCO owed Frescati and 
whether CARCO breached that duty. 718 F.3d at 214–15. 
Judge Fullam retired before the case was remanded. 
Upon its return to the District Court, the case was assigned 
to the Honorable Joel H. Slomsky as a successor judge 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 63. Under the terms of that rule, 
Judge Slomsky certified his familiarity with the record and 
recalled more than twenty witnesses over the course of a 
thirty-one-day proceeding. 
The District Court held that CARCO was liable to 
Frescati, and the United States as Frescati’s subrogee, for 
breach of contract. CARCO’s contract included a 
provision known as a safe berth warranty, which, for 
purposes of this appeal, warrantied that CARCO’s berth 
would be safe for the Athos I as long as the ship had a draft 
of 37 feet or less and Frescati did not cause the allision 
through bad navigation or negligent seamanship. The 
District Court concluded that CARCO breached the 
warranty because the Athos I had a draft of 36′ 7″ at the 
time of the allision, exercised good navigation and 
seamanship, and yet still hit an anchor within the 
geographic area covered by the warranty. On appeal, 
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CARCO argues that the Athos I had a draft much deeper 
than the warrantied depth of 37 feet, and that Frescati 
demonstrated negligent seamanship by violating several 
federal maritime regulations relating to underkeel 
clearance and safe navigation. 
The District Court also found CARCO liable in tort 
to Frescati,7 concluding that CARCO had a duty, as 
operator of the berth, to search for obstructions in the 
approach to its berth. Specifically, the District Court 
concluded that CARCO had a duty to use side-scan sonar 
to search for unknown obstructions to navigation in the 
approach to its berth, and to remove any such obstructions 
or warn invited ships—like the Athos I—of their presence. 
Because CARCO had not taken any action to search for 
obstructions, the District Court held CARCO liable in 
tort—for the same amount for which it was liable in 
contract. The District Court’s contract and tort holdings 
independently support the judgment for Frescati. 
CARCO, in a motion for partial summary judgment 
before the District Court, asked that its liability, like 
Frescati’s, be limited under the OPA. Because CARCO 
did not raise the defense until after the first trial and 
                                              
7 The United States is not a party to the tort claim, pursuant 
to a partial settlement agreement it reached with CARCO 
in 2009. 
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appeal, almost a decade into this litigation, the District 
Court held that the defense was waived, and in the 
alternative, that it failed on the merits. 
The District Court did, however, partially credit 
CARCO’s equitable recoupment defense against the 
United States. CARCO argued that the conduct of three 
federal agencies—the Coast Guard, NOAA, and the Army 
Corps of Engineers—misled CARCO into believing that 
the United States was maintaining the anchorage free of 
obstructions. In addition, CARCO argued that equity 
requires the United States to bear the cost of the cleanup 
rather than CARCO. The District Court ultimately reduced 
the United States’ recovery against CARCO by 50%, 
rather than acceding to CARCO’s request to eliminate its 
liability entirely. 
Finally, the District Court held that Frescati was 
entitled to prejudgment interest at the federal 
postjudgment rate rather than the higher U.S. prime rate 
requested by Frescati. 
The District Court ultimately awarded Frescati 
$55,497,375.958 on the claims of breach of contract and 
                                              
8 Frescati’s liability under the OPA for the cost of cleaning 
up the spill was limited to approximately $45 million. The 
United States reimbursed it for the remaining $88 million 
of its qualifying cleanup expenses. In addition to the $45 
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negligence, plus prejudgment interest of $16,010,773.75, 
for a total judgment of $71,508,149.70. The United States, 
after the court’s 50% reduction, was awarded 
$43,994,578.66 on its subrogated breach of contract claim, 
with prejudgment interest of $4,620,159.98, for a total 
judgment of $48,614,738.64. 
All three parties now appeal. We will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment in favor of Frescati on the 
breach of contract claim and the prejudgment interest 
award, as well as the District Court’s denial of CARCO’s 
motion for partial summary judgment on its limitation of 
liability defense. We will vacate the District Court’s 
judgment in favor of Frescati on the negligence claim. We 
will affirm in part the District Court’s judgment in favor 
of the United States with respect to CARCO’s liability on 
the subrogated breach of contract claim, but because 
                                              
million in OPA damages, Frescati also incurred roughly 
$10 million in damages that fell outside the scope of the 
OPA’s liability cap—third-party claims; cleanup expenses 
for recreational boats; the cost of removing the anchor and 
the pump casing from the riverbed; a settlement with a 
nearby nuclear power plant that had to shut down; 
unrepaired hull damage to the Athos I, and other 
miscellaneous expenses. Frescati’s contract recovery of 
$55 million was based on both its OPA and non-OPA 
damages. 
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CARCO’s equitable recoupment defense fails, we will 
reverse and remand for further proceedings to recalculate 
damages and prejudgment interest. 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had admiralty jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). We have jurisdiction 
over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
“On appeal from a bench trial, we review a district 
court’s findings of facts for clear error and exercise 
plenary review over conclusions of law.” Norfolk S. Ry. 
Co. v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. R.R., 870 F.3d 244, 253 (3d 
Cir. 2017). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it 
is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support 
displaying some hue of credibility or bears no rational 
relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.” VICI 
Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 283 (3d 
Cir. 2014); In re Frescati, 718 F.3d at 196. 
IV. The Safe Berth Warranty 
CARCO promised that the Athos I would be 
directed to a location “she may safely get (always afloat),” 
a promise known as a safe port or safe berth warranty. JA 
at 1211. Such a promise provides, among other things, 
“protection against damages to a ship incurred in an unsafe 
port to which the warranty applies.” In re Frescati, 718 
F.3d at 197. 
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A port is deemed safe where the particular 
chartered vessel can proceed to it, use it, and 
depart from it without, in the absence of 
abnormal weather or other occurrences, 
being exposed to dangers which cannot be 
avoided by good navigation and seamanship. 
Whether a port is safe refers to the particular 
ship at issue, and goes beyond the immediate 
area of the port itself to the adjacent areas the 
vessel must traverse to either enter or leave. 
In other words, a port is unsafe—and in 
violation of the safe berth warranty—where 
the named ship cannot reach it without harm 
(absent abnormal conditions or those not 
avoidable by adequate navigation and 
seamanship). 
Id. at 200 (quotations and citations omitted). “[T]he safe 
berth warranty is an express assurance made without 
regard to the amount of diligence taken by the charterer.” 
Id. at 203. For our purposes, a safe berth warranty 
promises that a ship with a draft less than the warrantied 
depth is covered by the warranty in the absence of bad 
navigation or negligent seamanship. 
Our prior opinion called for the District Court to 
resolve three issues on remand: the draft limit beyond 
which the safe berth warranty would not apply; the actual 
draft of the Athos I at the time of the allision; and whether 
21 
the warranty was negated by bad navigation or negligent 
seamanship. Id. at 204–05, 204 n.20. 
As an initial matter, the District Court found that the 
safe berth warranty applied to ships drawing less than 37 
feet, a finding neither party challenges on appeal. The 
remaining issues, then, are whether the Athos I had a draft 
of less than 37 feet, and if it did, whether bad navigation 
or negligent seamanship by Frescati negated the warranty. 
a. The Draft of the Athos I 
The District Court found that the Athos I had a draft 
of 36′ 7″ at the time of the allision. The court based this 
finding on the undisputed draft of the Athos I at the time 
of its departure from Puerto Miranda—36′ 6″—as well as 
expert testimony regarding the condition of the ship and 
its estimated draft at Paulsboro.9 
                                              
9 Frescati’s expert, Anthony Bowman, developed the 
Seamaster software program, which allows him to enter 
the measurements of a ship—including the weight, 
dimensions, and strength of all its constituent parts, such 
as the hull, cargo, and supplies—and calculate, among 
other things, a ship’s draft. Having considered the ship’s 
records, information about the ballast tanks, and his own 
software, Bowman testified that at the time of the allision, 
22 
CARCO challenges the District Court’s 
determination of the Athos I’s draft, arguing that the 
District Court improperly based its finding on a 
speculative assumption about the orientation of the 
abandoned anchor. Specifically, CARCO disputes the 
District Court’s finding that the anchor shifted from a 
flukes-down position to a flukes-up position sometime 
between 2001 and the allision in 2004, a shift that caused 
the anchor to intrude within the 37-foot safe depth 
promised by CARCO. CARCO argues that the District 
Court failed to make a finding as to the precise mechanism 
by which the anchor shifted from flukes-down to flukes-
up. The anchor’s orientation matters; if the accident 
occurred while the anchor was flukes-down, the Athos I 
necessarily would have had a draft that exceeded the scope 
of CARCO’s warranty.10 
                                              
the Athos I had a draft of 36′ 7″. The District Court 
credited his testimony. 
10 The District Court made undisputed findings of fact as 
to the height of the anchor in a flukes-down position (41 
inches or 3.42 feet) and the depth of the river at the time 
and location of the allision (41.65 feet). Assuming for the 
moment that the anchor was flukes-down, as CARCO 
argues, the allision would not have occurred unless the 
Athos I had a draft of at least 38.23 feet, or just under 
23 
Broadly speaking, the District Court made three 
findings of fact related to the anchor’s orientation. First, 
the court and parties agree that, three years before the 
allision, the anchor was in the flukes-down position.11 
Second, the District Court found that at some point before 
the allision, the anchor shifted into the flukes-up position. 
Finally, after the allision, the anchor was eventually 
discovered back in the flukes-down position—perhaps 
unsurprising, given the force of its encounter with the 
Athos I. 
CARCO attacks the second finding, arguing that 
there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the 
District Court’s suggestion that a “sweeping anchor chain” 
could have caught the anchor and shifted it into the flukes-
up position.12 
                                              
38′ 3″, significantly in excess of the warrantied draft of 37 
feet. 
11 Experts for both sides were able to identify the flukes-
down anchor in a sonar scan performed in 2001 as part of 
an independent geophysical study. 
12 Ships at anchor move with the tide, back and forth as the 
tide comes in and goes out. The anchor chain drags or 
“sweeps” across the riverbed as the ship floats, potentially 
shifting the position of objects on the riverbed, and leaving 
scour marks on the riverbed. Anchor chains also move 
24 
We find CARCO’s arguments unconvincing, 
primarily because the “sweeping anchor chain” theory, 
however plausible or implausible, is not necessary to 
sustain the District Court’s finding. Let us imagine a piece 
of furniture (a sofa, perhaps, or an armchair) that has fallen 
off the back of a pickup truck onto a roadway. One driver 
reports seeing the furniture in the right lane. A while later, 
a second driver hits the furniture. The second driver asserts 
that the furniture was in the left lane when he struck it, and 
provides evidence to that effect. A highway patrolman 
                                              
along the river bottom when the anchor is pulled back onto 
the ship. CARCO, for its part, characterizes the idea that 
an anchor chain might have moved the abandoned anchor 
as “fantastical,” “inexplicabl[e],” an “astonishing 
assertion,” “facially implausible,” “pure and wild 
speculation,” “pure speculation,” “conjecture,” 
“speculative and unsupported,” and, once again, 
“implausible.” CARCO Opening Br. 4, 53–55; CARCO 
Reply Br. 32. The District Court pointed out that scour 
marks were found on the river bottom near the site of the 
allision, but ultimately decided only that the anchor was in 
the flukes-up position at the time of the allision. JA at 78 
(“Although the actual cause of the anchor’s movement to 
a ‘flukes-up’ position will never be known, the Court finds 
that at some point after December 2001, this movement 
occurred and the anchor was positioned in a ‘flukes-up’ 
orientation when it allided with the Athos I.”). 
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shows up later and finds the furniture once again in the 
right lane. A court may find, without committing error, 
that the furniture was in the right lane and moved to the 
left without making a specific finding as to the precise 
method by which the furniture moved from one lane to the 
other. Perhaps another driver hit it; perhaps a pedestrian 
tried to move it out of the road but did not finish the job. 
When credible evidence shows that the second driver was 
driving in the left lane, a finding to that effect does not 
become error because the furniture was in the right lane 
when the first driver passed, or changed position after—or 
because of—the encounter with the second driver. 
Here, the record contains sufficient evidence to 
support the finding that the anchor was, in fact, flukes-up 
at the time of the allision. How exactly the anchor changed 
position does not impact our sufficiency determination. As 
an initial matter, the movement of the Athos I at the time 
of the allision and the damage to its hull are sufficient to 
show that the anchor was flukes-up. And substantial 
evidence unrelated to the anchor showed that the Athos I 
was drawing 36′ 7″ at the time of the allision—a draft at 
which the allision would not have occurred had the anchor 
been flukes-down. That is enough to support the District 
Court’s finding that the anchor moved from flukes-down 
to flukes-up. 
The movement of the ship and damage to its hull 
shows that the anchor must have been flukes-up. The 
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District Court found that the Athos I was moving astern 
and to port at the time of the allision, a finding CARCO 
does not challenge. Based on that movement, the scoring 
left by the anchor on the hull, the size and shape of the two 
holes the anchor created, and the damage to the anchor 
itself also supported the District Court’s finding that the 
anchor must have been flukes-up at the time of the allision. 
CARCO’s own expert witness, on cross-examination, 
testified that if the Athos I were moving astern and to port, 
the damage to the Athos I’s hull would necessarily require 
a flukes-up anchor.13 JA at 1021–22.  
Nor did the District Court base its finding of a 36′ 7″ 
draft on the flukes-up anchor alone. While CARCO argues 
that the anchor was flukes-down, and that therefore the 
Athos I must have had a deep draft, the reverse is also true. 
If the Athos I had a draft of 36′ 7″, then the anchor must 
have been flukes-up. The District Court credited expert 
testimony that the ship had a 36′ 7″ draft. The ballast tanks 
contained no extra liquid that would have affected the 
ship’s draft, a finding that CARCO does not challenge on 
appeal. The ship left Puerto Miranda with a draft of 36′ 6″. 
Visual observation of the ship by experts and 
crewmembers immediately after the allision suggested the 
Athos I had a 36′ 7″ draft before the allision. And, on 
                                              
13 CARCO’s theory at trial, abandoned on appeal, was that 
the ship was not moving astern and to port. 
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appeal, CARCO fails to offer any suggestion as to how the 
draft might have increased by more than a foot without the 
crew’s knowledge or any evidence that the ballast tanks 
were faulty.14 
We conclude there was no clear error in the District 
Court’s determination that the Athos I had a draft of 36′ 7″ 
at the time of the allision. The ship was, therefore, within 
the scope of CARCO’s safe berth warranty. 
b. Frescati’s Seamanship 
A safe berth warranty applies only in the absence of 
bad navigation or negligent seamanship. CARCO argues 
on appeal that Frescati violated several maritime 
regulations related to the operation of single-hulled 
tankers, and that those regulatory violations serve as 
sufficient proof of negligent seamanship. The District 
Court concluded that Frescati did not violate any relevant 
regulations, and enforced the safe berth warranty. We 
                                              
14 The Athos I passed safely over a 38-foot shoal less than 
fifteen minutes before the allision. JA at 203. It seems that 
if the Athos I had a draft deep enough to hit the flukes-
down anchor (a minimum of 38.23 feet, see supra note 10), 
it would have encountered the 38-foot shoal before it ever 
encountered the anchor. A flukes-down anchor would 
have been deeper than the 38-foot shoal even at the 
anchor’s shallowest point. JA at 77, 78, 85. 
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agree with the District Court that Frescati did not violate 
any relevant regulations. 
On appeal, CARCO argues specifically that Frescati 
violated two federal regulations: 33 C.F.R. § 157.455 and 
33 C.F.R. § 164.11. Section 157.455 applied to certain 
single-hulled tankers during the period they were being 
phased out of operation, while § 164.11 applies to certain 
ships above 1,600 gross tons. 33 C.F.R. §§ 157.400, 
164.01. Both sections applied to the Athos I at the time of 
the allision. 
 Section 157.455 requires the owner or operator of a 
single-hulled tanker to provide certain written guidance to 
the ship’s master for purposes of estimating the tanker’s 
underkeel clearance.15 33 C.F.R. § 157.455(a). It also 
                                              
15 33 C.F.R. § 157.455(a)–(b) reads: 
(a) The owner or operator of a tankship, that 
is not fitted with a double bottom that 
covers the entire cargo tank length, shall 
provide the tankship master with written 
under-keel clearance guidance that 
includes— 
(1) Factors to consider when 
calculating the ship’s deepest 
navigational draft; 
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(2) Factors to consider when 
calculating the anticipated 
controlling depth; 
(3) Consideration of weather or 
environmental conditions; and 
(4) Conditions which mandate 
when the tankship owner or 
operator shall be contacted 
prior to port entry or getting 
underway; if no such 
conditions exist, the guidance 
must contain a statement to 
that effect. 
(b) Prior to entering the port or place of 
destination and prior to getting underway, 
the master of a tankship that is not fitted 
with the double bottom that covers the 
entire cargo tank length shall plan the 
ship’s passage using guidance issued 
under paragraph (a) of this section and 
estimate the anticipated under-keel 
clearance. The tankship master and the 
pilot shall discuss the ship’s planned 
transit including the anticipated under-
keel clearance. An entry must be made in 
the tankship’s official log or in other 
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requires the master to use that guidance to plan the ship’s 
passage, estimate the underkeel clearance, consult with the 
relevant pilots who will guide the ship to its berth, and 
make a log entry reflecting discussion of the ship’s 
underkeel clearance with the pilot. 33 C.F.R. 
§ 157.455(b). Section 164.11 mandates that the master 
ensure the pilot is informed of certain information, 
including the ship’s draft and tidal conditions.16 33 C.F.R. 
§ 164.11. 
                                              
onboard documentation reflecting 
discussion of the ship’s anticipated 
passage. 
33 C.F.R. § 157.455(a)–(b). 
16 33 C.F.R. § 164.11 reads: 
The owner, master, or person in charge of each 
vessel underway shall ensure that: 
. . . . 
(k) If a pilot other than a member of the 
vessel’s crew is employed, the pilot is 
informed of the draft, maneuvering 
characteristics, and peculiarities of the 
vessel and of any abnormal circumstances 
on the vessel that may affect its safe 
navigation. 
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 CARCO argues that Frescati was responsible for 
three specific violations, each of which allegedly caused 
the allision. First, CARCO claims that Frescati failed to 
adequately plan the ship’s passage. Second, CARCO 
claims that Frescati failed to estimate the Athos I’s 
underkeel clearance. Finally, CARCO claims that Frescati 
failed to ensure that an adequate master-pilot exchange 
occurred, and made no log entry that would reflect such an 
exchange. 
 With respect to planning the passage, CARCO 
argues that 33 C.F.R. § 157.455 requires a written voyage 
plan. Frescati allegedly violated that requirement by 
failing to finalize an official voyage plan document using 
the Tsakos Voyage Plan form contained in the Tsakos 
Vessel Operation Procedures Manual. See JA at 1178–85. 
 The text of § 157.455 undermines CARCO’s 
argument. The regulation does not itself require a written 
voyage plan. Paragraph (a) of the regulation requires that 
Frescati create “written under-keel clearance guidance,” 
which must contain “factors to consider” when evaluating 
                                              
. . . 
(n) Tidal state for the area to be transited is 
known by the person directing movement 
of the vessel . . . . 
33 C.F.R. § 164.11. 
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draft, water depth, and weather conditions. Paragraph (b) 
requires that the master plan the ship’s passage using those 
“factors to consider” in the guidance required by 
paragraph (a). Nowhere does this regulation require that 
the master’s passage plan be in writing; the only reference 
to a writing in paragraph (b) comes in the requirement that 
some official log of the master-pilot conference be 
recorded. CARCO conflates the passage plan requirement 
of paragraph (b)—to consider certain relevant factors 
when planning—with the “Voyage Plan” form contained 
in Frescati’s Vessel Operation Procedures Manual. See JA 
at 1180. The Voyage Plan form focuses on plotting the 
course of the vessel from berth to berth; paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of the regulation, on the other hand, serve to create a 
reference list for the ship’s master of relevant factors to 
consider when estimating underkeel clearance. 
 Frescati satisfied the requirements of paragraph (a) 
by providing written underkeel clearance guidance in 
Section 3.417 of its Vessel Operation Procedures Manual. 
JA at 1191. The Manual appropriately lists factors to 
consider, including “sea state and swell,” “tidal 
                                              
17 The Vessel Operation Procedures Manual appears to 
contain a typographical error listing the appropriate 
section as 2.4 rather than 3.4, as it appears in the Table of 
Contents. See JA at 1189, 1191. 
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conditions,” and “the effect of squat,”18 and suggests to the 
master that 10% or 5% underkeel clearance margins would 
typically be appropriate. Id.  
 Furthermore, Frescati satisfied the planning 
requirement of paragraph (b) because the Athos I’s master, 
Captain Markoutsis, considered factors like the sea state, 
tidal condition, and the effect of squat. Even though 
CARCO provided a safe berth warranty for a draft up to 
37 feet, Captain Markoutsis loaded the ship to only 36′ 6″ 
because he was “afraid” of a 37-foot draft, and eventually 
entered the Delaware River with a draft of 36′ 7″. In re 
Frescati, 718 F.3d at 204. The charts in the Athos I were 
marked with the 38-foot controlling draft in the anchorage. 
JA at 992. Captain Teal, the river pilot, testified that he 
and Captain Markoutsis discussed the draft, wind, 
visibility, and tides. We agree with the District Court that 
Frescati fully complied with the planning requirement of 
                                              
18 “Squat is a hydrodynamic phenomenon, which occurs 
when a ship is moving through the waters. As a ship moves 
forward, it displaces a volume of water. The displaced 
water rushes under the keel of the ship and creates a low 
pressure area causing the ship to sink down toward the 
riverbed. The faster a ship is moving, the more the ship 
will sink down towards the riverbed. This process causes 
a ship to be closer to the riverbed by increasing a vessel’s 
draft.” JA at 70 (citations omitted). 
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§ 157.455(b)—that is, to use the factors listed in the 
Vessel Operating Procedures Manual when planning the 
passage. 
 CARCO’s second argument is that Frescati violated 
§ 157.455(b) because Captain Markoutsis failed to 
estimate the Athos I’s underkeel clearance. The District 
Court did not err in finding that Captain Markoutsis had 
estimated underkeel clearance. Captain Markoutsis 
discussed the draft, tidal conditions, and anticipated 
underkeel clearance with Captain Teal. JA at 801–802. 
They estimated that the ship would have at least 1.5 
meters’ clearance—nearly five feet. Id. Captains Bethel 
and Markoutsis also discussed the draft and believed they 
would have sufficient clearance. JA at 833, 837. CARCO 
highlights that there is no evidence of written underkeel 
clearance estimates, but § 157.455 does not require written 
estimates. 
Finally, CARCO argues that the master-pilot 
exchange required by § 157.455 and § 164.11 was 
inadequate. In general, master-pilot exchanges are 
intended to allow the master to share the navigational 
characteristics of his ship with the pilot who will be 
guiding it, and for the pilot to share local conditions such 
as weather, depth, and the tide with the master. Section 
157.455(b) requires that “[t]he tankship master and the 
pilot shall discuss the ship’s planned transit including the 
anticipated under-keel clearance. An entry must be made 
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in the tankship’s official log or in other onboard 
documentation reflecting discussion of the ship’s 
anticipated passage.” 33 C.F.R. § 157.455(b). Section 
164.11 requires that the master ensure that 
[i]f a pilot other than a member of the vessel’s 
crew is employed, the pilot is informed of the 
draft, maneuvering characteristics, and 
peculiarities of the vessel and of any 
abnormal circumstances on the vessel that 
may affect its safe navigation. . . . [and that 
the] [t]idal state for the area to be transited is 
known by the person directing movement of 
the vessel. 
33 C.F.R. § 164.11(k), (n). 
Captain Markoutsis was responsible for discussing 
the draft, underkeel clearance, maneuvering 
characteristics, and tidal state with the two pilots who 
guided the Athos I. The testimony shows that Captain 
Markoutsis did so, discussing all the relevant information 
with both pilots, and that he recorded the conversation on 
the signed Pilot Card, which served as sufficient 
documentation of the master-pilot conference. The 
District Court additionally credited Frescati’s expert 
witness, Captain Betz, who observed both Captain Teal 
and Captain Bethel testify. Captain Betz opined that the 
36 
master-pilot exchanges were adequate and customary in 
all respects. 
 Frescati operated the Athos I with neither bad 
navigation nor negligent seamanship. Nevertheless, the 
allision occurred. The District Court did not err in 
concluding that the allision resulted from a breach of 
CARCO’s safe berth warranty. 
V. Wharfinger Negligence 
CARCO wore two hats in its dealings with Frescati, 
as a shipping customer and as a wharfinger. These dual 
roles exposed CARCO to liability under two independent 
legal theories. CARCO’s first role, as a shipping customer 
that contracted with Frescati for delivery of a shipment of 
crude oil, resulted in CARCO’s liability under the 
contractual safe berth warranty, discussed above. The 
second, as the wharfinger for the Paulsboro berth that was 
the Athos I’s intended destination, resulted in the District 
Court’s finding of negligence and CARCO’s 
corresponding liability in tort.  
Both theories of liability independently support the 
District Court’s judgment against CARCO. As a result, 
our decision to affirm the judgment based on CARCO’s 
contractual liability means that we are not required to 
delve into the District Court’s tort analysis. However, 
having reviewed that analysis, we harbor serious doubts 
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about the appropriateness of the court’s proposed duty of 
care. For that reason, we are compelled to make clear that 
we will affirm the District Court’s judgment based solely 
on CARCO’s breach of contract. 
A wharfinger’s duty is more limited than that of a 
shipping customer who has provided a safe berth warranty. 
As we previously wrote: 
In the tort context, . . . a wharfinger is not a 
guarantor of a visiting ship’s safety, but is 
bound to use reasonable diligence in 
ascertaining whether the berths themselves 
and the approaches to them are in an ordinary 
condition of safety for vessels coming to and 
lying at the wharf. This is not an 
unconstrained mandate to ensure safe 
surroundings or warn of hazards merely in 
the vicinity. Instead, a visiting ship may only 
expect that the owner of a wharf has afforded 
it a safe approach. In being invited to dock at 
a particular port, a vessel should be able to 
enter, use and exit a wharfinger’s dock 
facilities without being exposed to dangers 
that cannot be avoided by reasonably prudent 
navigation and seamanship. 
In re Frescati, 718 F.3d at 207 (quotations and citations 
omitted). In short, and as a general matter, a wharfinger’s 
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duty is to use reasonable diligence to ascertain whether the 
approach to its berth is safe for an invited vessel.19 
 We remanded for the District Court to determine in 
the first instance what reasonable diligence required of 
CARCO under the circumstances of this case, and whether 
CARCO breached that standard. Id. On remand, the 
District Court concluded that 
a reasonably prudent terminal operator 
should periodically scan the approach to its 
dock for hazards to navigation as long as 
ships are being invited there. In this case, the 
standard would require that side-scan sonar 
be used to search the approach for 
obstructions that are potential hazards to 
navigation. If an obstruction is located, a 
terminal operator is then required to remove 
it, and if the terminal operator cannot remove 
it, notice of the hazard must be given to 
                                              
19 We previously determined that the allision occurred in 
the approach to CARCO’s berth—the geographic area 
within which a wharfinger’s duty exists—and as a result, 
CARCO had a duty to use reasonable diligence to provide 
the Athos I with a safe approach. In re Frescati, 718 F.3d 
at 211. 
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incoming ships by marking it as a hazard 
and/or warning ships of its presence. 
JA at 132. Because CARCO did nothing to look for 
obstructions, the District Court held that it had breached 
its duty. 
The District Court chose its standard by 
determining what the “demands of reasonableness and 
prudence” required. JA at 129. Citing Judge Learned 
Hand’s famous formula from United States v. Carroll 
Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), the court concluded 
that the precaution of a preemptive side-scan sonar search 
would be less burdensome than the probability of an 
allision multiplied by the serious harm caused by a spill of 
toxic substances like crude oil. 
We have doubts about the District Court’s 
balancing of the cost of preventative measures on one hand 
and the cost of potential accidents on the other. The court 
found that a general scan of the approach to CARCO’s 
berth and the berth itself would have cost between $7,500 
and $11,000, and would have prevented the allision. Yet 
in this very case, the targeted scan of the area where the 
allision occurred, conducted only eight days after the 
allision, did not identify the anchor. The first set of 93 
side-scan sonar passes conducted by Frescati’s expert, 
John Fish—at a cost of $38,577—identified a pump casing 
on the river bottom. The anchor, however, went 
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unrecognized.20 We do not share the District Court’s 
confidence that a general $11,000 scan of the approach 
and berth would have “recognized” the anchor with 
sufficient clarity to prevent the allision, given that a 
targeted $38,000 scan for obstructions failed to do so. 
Beyond the questionable utility of side-scan sonar 
as applied to this case, we doubt whether imposing a 
specific duty to require side-scan sonar would be useful 
for wharfingers in the ordinary course of their business. 
Single-hulled vessels like the Athos I present unique risks, 
and have been treated with special care by regulators. See, 
e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 157.455. Today, as a result of those 
unique risks, such vessels are no longer permitted to 
operate in the waters of the United States. See 46 U.S.C. 
§ 3703a (banning single-hulled oil tankers in the waters of 
the United States after January 1, 2015). Furthermore, 
side-scan sonar is not the only method available to detect 
and recognize obstructions, as the District Court pointed 
out.21 Even if we were to accept the court’s balancing of 
                                              
20 Fish testified that the side-scan sonar equipment 
“detected” the anchor, but neither he nor anyone else 
“recognized” it until after the second set of scans were 
taken. JA at 927. 
21 The court determined that CARCO should have used 
side-scan sonar to search for obstructions, but seemed 
willing to accept that other methods of searching for 
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cost, risk, and the magnitude of the potential harm, the 
high standard set forth in this case—involving a risky 
single-hulled vessel—would not necessarily apply to 
future cases, which will necessarily involve only double-
hulled vessels.22 
We are not unsympathetic to the position in which 
we placed the District Court by asking it to specify the 
duty of care at play in this case. The District Court has 
conscientiously complied. And we stand by our previous 
holding that CARCO had some duty to use reasonable 
diligence to provide the Athos I with a safe approach to its 
                                              
obstructions might accomplish the same purpose. It noted 
that “side-scan sonar . . . is not the only method available 
in the industry to search for hazardous debris. . . . Since 
the standard of care involves factual issues, the methods 
may vary when the conditions in the approach to each 
terminal are examined.” JA at 132 n.109. 
22 Indeed, five years after the Athos I allision, the 
Norwegian tanker SKS Satilla, carrying nearly 42 million 
gallons of crude oil, allided with a sunken oil rig in the 
Gulf of Mexico, sustaining “substantial damage to the port 
side of her hull.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, In re Ensco Offshore Co., No. 4:09-CV-2838, ECF 
No. 185 at 3, ¶¶ 6–7 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2014). But 
“[b]ecause the SATILLA [was] a double hulled vessel[,] 
. . . there was no discharge of crude oil.” Id. at 3, ¶ 9. 
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berth—a duty it may or may not have breached. In re 
Frescati, 718 F.3d at 211. Nevertheless, given CARCO’s 
independent liability in contract and our decision to affirm 
on that basis, we will once again decline to outline 
precisely what CARCO’s duty of reasonable diligence 
entailed. 
VI. Subrogation and Equitable Recoupment 
This litigation does not implicate the interests of 
only Frescati and CARCO. The United States reimbursed 
Frescati for $88 million in cleanup expenses above the 
liability limit established by the OPA. Consequently, the 
United States became subrogated to Frescati’s claims, and 
joined the fray by filing suit against CARCO in 2008.23 
                                              
23 The United States and CARCO reached a partial 
settlement agreement before the first trial. Both the United 
States and CARCO agreed to forgo any negligence claims 
they might have had against one another. The parties 
agreed that the United States would pursue only its 
contract claim against CARCO. As a result, the United 
States’ judgment against CARCO was based solely on 
CARCO’s contractual liability under the safe berth 
warranty. CARCO, for its part, reserved in the settlement 
agreement 
each and every substantive and procedural 
right available to a defendant . . . including 
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Frescati initially paid for the oil spill cleanup costs 
as a “responsible party” under the OPA. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2702(a). The OPA allows a responsible party like 
Frescati to limit its liability to a specified sum; any cleanup 
costs above that amount are reimbursed out of the Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund.24 See 33 U.S.C. § 2704. Under this 
                                              
but not limited to the right to raise affirmative 
defenses under any theory or doctrine of law 
or equity, the right to assert setoff or 
recoupment and the right to assert 
compulsory or non-compulsory 
counterclaims other than a Claim for 
Contribution or Indemnity . . . . 
JA at 391. 
24 The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, administered by the 
Coast Guard, serves much like insurance for the oil 
transportation industry. Companies that import oil into the 
United States pay a per-barrel fee into the Trust Fund. 
When a tanker vessel spills oil, the OPA assigns liability 
for the cleanup to a “responsible party”—typically the 
owner of the vessel from which the oil spilled. The 
responsible party is liable for all cleanup costs associated 
with the spill. If the costs exceed a liability cap established 
by the OPA, the Trust Fund reimburses the responsible 
party for all expenses above the statutory cap. Liability 
under the OPA does not preclude a responsible party from 
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scheme, Frescati’s liability for the cost of the oil spill 
cleanup was limited to approximately $45 million. The 
Trust Fund reimbursed Frescati for its remaining cleanup 
costs, which totaled approximately $88 million. The 
United States then became statutorily “subrogated to all 
rights, claims, and causes of action that the claimant 
[Frescati] has under any other law.” 33 U.S.C. § 2715(a). 
The United States pursued these claims against CARCO 
as a “person who is liable, pursuant to any law, to the 
compensated claimant [Frescati] or to the Fund, for the 
cost or damages for which the compensation was paid.” 33 
U.S.C. § 2715(c). 
Pursuant to the partial settlement agreement, the 
United States limited itself to the same contractual claims 
Frescati asserted. Because CARCO was liable to Frescati 
in contract, it was also liable to the United States for the 
amount the Trust Fund had reimbursed Frescati: nearly 
$88 million. But CARCO asserted a defense against the 
United States it did not assert against Frescati—equitable 
                                              
bringing any claims it has against a third party under any 
other law. The United States, to the extent the Trust Fund 
has reimbursed the responsible party’s costs, steps into the 
shoes of the responsible party as subrogee and may pursue 
claims against a third party as if it were the responsible 
party. Any recovery won by the United States is returned 
to the Trust Fund to cover future oil spill reimbursements. 
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recoupment—and in response, the District Court reduced 
the United States’ judgment by 50%. Both CARCO and 
the United States appealed. CARCO argues that the 
District Court erred by not eliminating the United States’ 
recovery, while the United States argues that the District 
Court should have left the contract judgment untouched 
and denied CARCO any equitable remedy. We conclude 
that the District Court erred by reducing the United States’ 
judgment by 50%. The United States is entitled to a full 
recovery. 
a. Subrogation and Subrogee-Specific 
Defenses 
As an initial matter, we note that the dispute 
between CARCO and the United States presents an 
unusual question about the nature of subrogation. 
Subrogation itself is not unusual; in general terms, it 
“simply means substitution of one person for another; that 
is, one person is allowed to stand in the shoes of another 
and assert that person’s rights against a third party.” US 
Airways v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 97 n.5 (2013). Most 
often, it arises in the insurance context as a procedural 
mechanism to allow an insurer (the subrogee) to step into 
the shoes of its insured (the subrogor) after it has 
compensated the insured for harm caused by a third party. 
The subrogee, having stepped into the shoes of the 
subrogor, is entitled to assert all of the subrogor’s rights 
and claims against the responsible third party. Likewise, 
46 
the third party—now defending an action brought by the 
subrogee—is entitled to assert every defense it otherwise 
could have raised against the subrogor. In that vein, the 
third party’s liability to a subrogee cannot be greater than 
it would have been to the subrogor. Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 24. 
All that is unexceptional. The unusual question 
presented here is whether a third party may assert a 
defense against a subrogee that it could not assert against 
the subrogor. As we discussed above, CARCO is liable to 
Frescati, the subrogor, in contract. Consequently, CARCO 
is liable to the United States, the subrogee, under that very 
same contract. But CARCO wishes to assert a defense 
against the United States—namely, that equitable 
recoupment requires the United States to bear the loss 
rather than CARCO because of the allegedly misleading 
conduct of three federal agencies—that it could not assert 
against Frescati. 
The United States makes a related argument. Its 
position is that the equitable recoupment defense, 
predicated as it is on the conduct of federal agencies rather 
than the contractual relationship between Frescati and the 
United States, violates the statutory subrogation provision 
of the OPA. Specifically, the United States argues that it 
is entitled to “all [of Frescati’s] rights, claims, and causes 
of action” under the OPA. 33 U.S.C. § 2715(a). Frescati’s 
contractual right is not limited by CARCO’s claims 
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against the Coast Guard, NOAA, and the Army Corps of 
Engineers; the United States asserting Frescati’s 
contractual right should also not be so limited, and to do 
otherwise would infringe on the United States’ statutory 
entitlement. When Frescati has the right to a full recovery 
under its contract, the argument goes, so does the United 
States. 
We agree. CARCO may only assert defenses 
against the United States’ subrogated claims which it 
could have asserted against Frescati—including any 
equitable recoupment defense it could have asserted 
against Frescati. In its capacity as a subrogee, the United 
States should be subject to the same treatment as Frescati. 
Just as the United States, as subrogee, may only assert 
Frescati’s claims, CARCO, as defendant, is not entitled to 
extra defenses because the United States asserts Frescati’s 
claims rather than Frescati itself. Of course, no party is 
exempt from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
United States is subject to the ordinary procedural rules 
governing counterclaims and third-party complaints, and 
the OPA does not bar CARCO from asserting whatever 
claims it has against the United States using those 
recognized procedural mechanisms where appropriate.25 
                                              
25 This issue is complicated by the fact that the specific 
defense asserted by CARCO, equitable recoupment, is 
sometimes pleaded as a defense, and sometimes as a 
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In this case, the only claim asserted by the United 
States is Frescati’s contract claim. In re Frescati, 718 F.3d 
at 189; JA at 390. It follows that CARCO’s equitable 
recoupment defense must be directed toward the United 
States’ contract claim. See 718 F.3d at 214 (declining to 
preclude CARCO from raising “equitable defense[s] to the 
Government’s subrogation claims”). If CARCO had other 
cognizable claims against the three federal agencies 
involved in regulating the Delaware River and the 
anchorage, sounding in tort or otherwise, it was free to 
assert them in a third-party complaint or counterclaim, just 
as the United States was free to pursue other claims against 
CARCO.26 In that light, we proceed to analyze CARCO’s 
                                              
counterclaim. We do not mean to imply that CARCO 
should have pleaded equitable recoupment as a 
counterclaim rather than a defense. However it is pleaded, 
“recoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of 
some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff’s 
action is grounded,” and here, the plaintiff’s action is 
grounded in Frescati’s contractual right. Bull v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935). To the extent CARCO 
had cognizable claims against the Coast Guard, NOAA, 
and the Army Corps of Engineers, it should have asserted 
those claims directly, rather than as a defense to Frescati’s 
now-subrogated contract claim. 
26 CARCO was also free to waive its claims against the 
United States, and vice versa. Indeed, both CARCO and 
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equitable recoupment defense as it applies to the United 
States’ contractual rights. 
b. Equitable Recoupment 
Equitable recoupment is a “principle that 
diminishes a party’s right to recover a debt to the extent 
that the party holds money or property of the debtor to 
which the party has no right.”27 In re Frescati, 718 F.3d at 
                                              
the United States waived certain rights in the 2009 partial 
settlement agreement, including CARCO’s waivers of the 
rights to bring a “Claim for Contribution or Indemnity . . . 
whether based on principles of common law, contract, 
quasi-contract or tort,” and “demand that the court reduce 
or offset the damages awarded to the United States . . . 
based on evidence that the negligence or fault of the 
United States in failing to detect, mark and/or remove 
underwater obstructions to navigation . . . caused or 
contributed to the ATHOS I Incident.” JA at 389. At an 
earlier stage in the litigation, the United States argued that 
CARCO’s equitable recoupment defense amounted to a 
violation of the settlement agreement. The United States 
eventually waived that argument by failing to raise it at the 
first trial, and so we need not consider it today. In re 
Frescati, 718 F.3d at 214. 
27 A classic example of recoupment is a situation in which 
the statute of limitations is different for two related claims 
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214 n.35. For an equitable recoupment defense to succeed, 
the defendant must possess a claim against the plaintiff 
arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the 
plaintiff’s suit, seeking relief of the same kind as that 
sought by the plaintiff, in an amount no greater than that 
                                              
arising out of the same transaction—when, for example, 
the statute of limitations period during which the United 
States may file a claim against a taxpayer for 
underpayment of the income tax is longer than the period 
during which a taxpayer may file a claim for a refund of 
overpayment of the estate tax. The taxpayer (in this case, 
the estate of a decedent) pays the estate tax and final year’s 
income tax. Sometime later, after the statute of limitations 
has run on the estate tax overpayment but not the income 
tax underpayment, the government claims the taxpayer 
owes additional income tax for the taxpayer’s final year. 
Due to the increased income tax liability for the year, the 
taxpayer now owes less in estate tax—but the statute of 
limitations has already run, and the taxpayer cannot amend 
the estate tax return. In an action brought by the 
government to recover the extra income tax owed, the 
taxpayer may assert an equitable recoupment defense for 
the amount of the overpayment of the estate tax, even 
though the statute of limitations has run and the taxpayer 
would not otherwise have been able to recover the 
overpayment. See generally Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 
247 (1935). 
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sought by the plaintiff. See Livera v. First Nat’l State Bank 
of New Jersey, 879 F.2d 1186, 1195 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 CARCO’s equitable recoupment defense faces at 
least two serious obstacles. As an initial matter, the United 
States questions whether CARCO possesses a “claim” 
against it, rather than a generalized request for the court to 
balance the equities. Second, the United States questions 
whether CARCO seeks relief of the same kind as the 
United States. On both points, CARCO fails to meet its 
burden. 
 CARCO’s claim, such as it is, appears to be that the 
equities favor CARCO, and require the United States to 
bear the cost of the spill. CARCO argues that the United 
States, through the Coast Guard, NOAA, and the Army 
Corps of Engineers, had responsibility for maintaining the 
anchorage where the allision occurred free of obstructions. 
In the alternative, if the agencies were not responsible to 
preemptively search for obstructions, CARCO argues they 
should have more explicitly made clear that they were not 
conducting such searches. CARCO asserts that it 
reasonably believed, based on the agencies’ conduct, that 
the agencies were maintaining the anchorage free of 
obstructions. Additionally, CARCO argues that equity 
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requires the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to bear the cost 
of the cleanup rather than CARCO.28 
                                              
28 Though it is not necessary to our holding, we note that 
these equities do not appear to favor CARCO. As to 
agency regulation and maintenance of the anchorage 
where the allision occurred, the District Court held that the 
agencies did not have a duty to maintain the anchorage 
free of obstructions. The United States does not 
preemptively search for obstructions in the anchorage, it is 
not responsible for doing so, and it did not tell CARCO 
that it would do so. To the extent CARCO believed 
otherwise, CARCO simply misunderstood the regulatory 
structure and the responsibilities (and indeed, the 
capabilities) of the agencies. 
Additionally, to the extent—if at all—that the Coast 
Guard, NOAA, and the Army Corps of Engineers were 
responsible for the Athos I oil spill, reducing the recovery 
of the United States in this case would not be equitable. 
Beyond our concerns relating to subrogation (equity 
would certainly not favor reducing Frescati’s recovery 
under these circumstances), such a decision would impose 
liability on the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, not the 
responsible agencies. Any recovery based on the United 
States’ subrogated claim flows back to the Trust Fund, out 
of which the United States originally reimbursed Frescati. 
26 U.S.C. § 9509(b)(3). The Trust Fund is not intended (or 
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 Equitable recoupment requires more than just a 
request to balance the equities. CARCO points out that 
although equitable recoupment most often arises in the 
context of offsetting monetary claims, as in tax or 
bankruptcy cases, it is not necessarily limited to those 
situations. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. 
                                              
allowed by statute) to be used as a slush fund to cover the 
liabilities of federal agencies. See 33 U.S.C. § 2712 (“Uses 
of the Fund”). 
As a final point, the purpose of the Trust Fund is not to 
absorb the cost of cleaning up oil spills; indeed, almost the 
opposite is true. The OPA creates a strict liability regime 
for responsible parties, while capping that liability at a set 
amount. But the Trust Fund was not designed to bear those 
costs indefinitely; the subrogation provision of 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2715 allows the United States, on behalf of the Trust 
Fund, to pursue any claim a responsible party could have 
brought against a third party under any law, in order to 
recover the money paid out by the Trust Fund and preserve 
the Trust Fund’s ability to respond quickly to spills in the 
future. The OPA is intended to quickly compensate 
victims of spills, minimize environmental damage, and 
internalize the costs of oil spills within the oil industry. 
The subrogation provision serves those purposes by letting 
cleanup costs fall upon the liable party, rather than with 
the Trust Fund. 
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New York, 194 F. Supp. 2d 104, 136–37 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(allowing an equitable recoupment defense in the context 
of offsetting requests for declaratory judgments in a land 
rights case). But CARCO still must assert some cognizable 
claim, rather than simply a request for the Court to reduce 
the United States’ damages in the interest of equity. Here, 
CARCO has failed to do so. 
 Neither does CARCO seek the same kind of relief 
as the United States. The United States seeks contractual 
relief, to which it is entitled by operation of statute. See 33 
U.S.C. § 2715. CARCO, by contrast, seeks equitable 
relief, or (on another reading) essentially tort-based relief 
grounded in misrepresentation by the agencies. The 
mismatched relief sought by CARCO and the United 
States does not support CARCO’s equitable recoupment 
defense. 
The requirement that a defendant seek the same 
kind of relief as has been sought in the plaintiff’s claim is 
a fundamental requisite for recoupment. The defense is not 
intended to be a catch-all to allow any claims otherwise 
barred by time, settlement, or statute to be heard as equity 
seems to require. Equitable recoupment is intended to 
allow only truly similar claims arising from the same 
transaction to offset one another in the interest of equity 
between the parties. As noted, equitable recoupment is 
well-suited for disputes in which two claims arise out of 
the same taxable event or the same contractual obligation, 
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as often seen in tax or bankruptcy cases. When, as here, 
the plaintiff seeks relief on a contract, the defendant may 
not resort to equitable recoupment as a means to assert a 
non-contractual claim, whether sounding in an equitable-
balancing analysis, in tort, or otherwise. 
 CARCO has failed to meet its burden of 
establishing an equitable recoupment defense. It is liable 
to the United States in full. 
VII. Limitation of Liability under the Oil Pollution 
Act 
CARCO argues that a provision of the OPA, 33 
U.S.C. § 2702(d)(2)(B), limits its liability in this case to 
the same extent to which Frescati’s liability was limited—
approximately $45 million. Because CARCO did not raise 
this defense with the requisite clarity until nearly ten years 
after this litigation began, the District Court concluded that 
CARCO waived it. We agree that the defense was waived. 
A District Court’s holding that an affirmative 
defense has been waived is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Cetel v. Kirwan Financial Group, Inc., 460 
F.3d 494, 506 (3d Cir. 2006). Waiver is appropriate if the 
party raising the defense did not do so at a “pragmatically 
sufficient time” and if the opposing party would be 
prejudiced if the defense were allowed. Charpentier v. 
Godsil, 937 F.2d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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Whether CARCO raised its defense at a 
pragmatically sufficient time requires us to determine 
when CARCO first raised the § 2702(d)(2)(B) defense. 
CARCO argues that it first raised the limitation defense in 
its 2005 answer to Frescati’s Amended Counterclaim by 
referring to the OPA. The District Court concluded that 
CARCO’s answer contained nothing that would have put 
Frescati or the United States on notice that CARCO 
planned to rely on a limitation of liability defense. In 
general, “[a]n affirmative defense . . . ‘need not be 
articulated with any rigorous degree of specificity, and is 
sufficiently raised for purposes of [Fed. R. Civ. P. 8] by its 
bare assertion.’ ” Moody v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 
206, 218 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Zotos v. Lindbergh Sch. 
Dist., 121 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir. 1997)). Nevertheless, the 
party asserting the defense must actually do so, and in a 
way that gives fair notice of that defense. 
CARCO relies on the averment listed as its 
“Seventh Separate Defense,” which reads simply: “The 
claims and causes of action set forth in the plaintiffs’ 
Amended Counterclaim are barred in whole or in part by 
the provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2701, et seq.” JA at 355. Noticeably absent from this 
general averment is any specific citation to the limitation 
of liability defense or even a description of the nature of 
the defense. This is significant, because the OPA includes 
a number of potential affirmative defenses. See, e.g., 33 
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U.S.C. § 2702(b) (limiting scope of damages for which the 
OPA imposes liability); § 2702(c) (excluding certain oil 
spills from OPA liability); § 2702(d)(1)(A) (shifting 
liability under the OPA to a solely responsible third party); 
§ 2702(d)(2) (limiting the liability of certain parties under 
the OPA); § 2703 (“Defenses to liability”). CARCO’s 
general reference to the entirety of the OPA did not 
provide adequate information from which Frescati could 
determine that CARCO was seeking to limit its liability 
under § 2702(d)(2)(B). Nor did CARCO develop this 
defense at any point before the first trial. For that reason, 
CARCO’s unspecified reference to the OPA did not 
provide the requisite fair notice to Frescati. 
Furthermore, Frescati would be prejudiced if the 
defense were allowed. As the District Court found, if 
CARCO had asserted its defense in a timely fashion, 
fifteen days of depositions and trial testimony from seven 
witnesses could have been avoided, along with the OPA 
damages phase of the first trial.29 
                                              
29 Allowing CARCO to assert the defense after failing to 
raise it at a practicable time wastes the District Court’s 
resources as well. 
Affirmative defenses must be raised as early 
as practicable, not only to avoid prejudice, 
but also to promote judicial economy. If a 
58 
CARCO did not clearly assert the limitation defense 
until nearly a decade after this action commenced, and 
over a year after the first trial and appeal had concluded. 
The District Court appropriately concluded that CARCO 
had not raised the defense at a pragmatically sufficient 
time, and that Frescati would be prejudiced if the defense 
were allowed. The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding the defense waived.30 
VIII. Prejudgment Interest Rate 
The District Court awarded Frescati prejudgment 
interest of just over $16 million. Frescati, in its cross-
appeal from the District Court’s judgment, argues that the 
District Court erred by using the federal postjudgment 
                                              
party has a successful affirmative defense, 
raising that defense as early as possible, and 
permitting a court to rule on it, may terminate 
the proceedings at that point without wasting 
precious legal and judicial resources. 
Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2002). 
30 It is worth noting that the United States similarly waived 
a defense by its failure to raise an argument in the first 
trial. We previously held that the United States waived its 
right to object to CARCO’s equitable recoupment defense 
on the basis that it violated the terms of the partial 
settlement agreement. In re Frescati, 718 F.3d at 214. 
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interest rate set by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) to determine the 
amount of the prejudgment interest award. Specifically, 
Frescati argues that the District Court improperly believed 
itself bound to use the federal postjudgment rate rather 
than the higher U.S. prime rate because Frescati did not 
present evidence of its borrowing costs. 
An award of prejudgment interest is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Ambromovage v. United Mine 
Workers of Am., 726 F.2d 972, 981–82 (3d Cir. 1984); see 
also Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Nav. Co., 785 F.2d 59, 63 
(3d Cir. 1986). When selecting an interest rate, the District 
Court must keep in mind that the rate and corresponding 
award “must be compensatory rather than punitive.” Del. 
River & Bay Auth. v. Kopacz, 584 F.3d 622, 634 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
Here, the District Court awarded Frescati 
prejudgment interest at the one-year Treasury rate—the 
same rate used as the federal postjudgment interest rate. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Importantly, the District Court 
found that the postjudgment rate would “fairly and 
adequately compensate Frescati for its losses.” JA at 183. 
Frescati argues that, in the absence of evidence of 
borrowing costs, we should require the use of the U.S. 
prime rate. We grant that, had the District Court chosen to 
use the prime rate, it would not have abused its discretion 
even without extensive proof of borrowing costs. Taxman 
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v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1566 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc). Indeed, the prime rate is commonly used to 
approximate the cost the defendant would have paid to 
borrow in the market, and at least one court appears to 
require it. See, e.g., Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality 
Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1989) (requiring 
use of the prime rate in certain circumstances); see also 
Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 84 F.3d 446, 450–51 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he prime rate is not merely as 
appropriate as the Treasury Bill rate, but more appropriate 
. . . .”). In this Circuit, however, a district court is not 
constrained to the use of only the prime rate: “[i]n 
exercising [its] discretion, . . . the court may be guided by 
the rate set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.” Sun Ship, 785 F.2d 
at 63; Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1566 (“[A] court ‘may’ use the 
post-judgment standards of 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) [to 
calculate prejudgment interest, though] it is not compelled 
to do so.”).31 
The District Court determined that the federal 
postjudgment rate “fairly and adequately compensate[s] 
                                              
31 Nor was it an abuse of discretion for the District Court 
to adopt a variable interest rate. Interest accumulated for 
more than a decade, and during that time prevailing 
interest rates changed substantially. 
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Frescati for its losses.” JA at 183. Under our Court’s 
precedent, the District Court acted within its discretion. 
IX. Conclusion 
The District Court’s order dated August 17, 2016 
will be affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in 
part. The District Court’s judgment in favor of Frescati on 
the breach of contract claim and the prejudgment interest 
award will be affirmed. The District Court’s judgment in 
favor of Frescati on the negligence claim will be vacated. 
The District Court’s judgment in favor of the United States 
will be affirmed in part with respect to CARCO’s liability 
on the subrogated breach of contract claim, but the 
judgment will be reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings in light of our equitable recoupment ruling for 
the purpose of recalculating damages and prejudgment 
interest. The District Court’s order dated April 9, 2015, 
denying CARCO’s motion for partial summary judgment 
on its limitation of liability defense, will be affirmed. 
